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Abstract 
The European Court of Human Rights decision in SAS from France illustrates how a policy and national mantra that os-
tensibly aims to enhance inclusiveness, ‘living together’, is legally deployed in a manner that may have the opposite ef-
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making the decision to do so, the Court focuses on radicalism and women’s oppression amongst Muslims. Taking the 
notion of living together as the beginning point, the paper explores the normative assumptions underlying this notion 
as illustrated in the judgment of the Court. An alternative approach, drawing on the work of Derrida for the notion of 
‘living well together’ will be proposed and its implications for social inclusion explicated. The paper’s aim is to move be-
yond the specific example of SAS and France to argue that the SAS pattern of identifying particular values as ‘national 
values’, the deployment of those values through law, policy and public discourse, and their exclusionary effects is play-
ing out in a number of Western democracies, including Canada, the country with which the author is most familiar. Be-
cause of this widespread dissemination of values and their framing as representative of who ‘we’ are, there is a press-
ing need to consider the potentially alienating effects of a specific manifestation of ‘living together’ and an alternative 
model of ‘living well together’. 
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1. Introduction 
The SAS v France1 decision by the European Court of 
Human Rights is one of many high profile cases involv-
ing Muslim women and their dress.2 To describe the 
preoccupation with Muslim women’s dress as ‘West-
ern’ would unduly simplify a complex issue: the ‘veil’ 
has been a site of contention in Canada, France, Tur-
                                                          
1 SAS v France, [2014] ECHR 695. 
2 See Chaib and Brems (2013) for a discussion of procedural 
justice, European face veil bans, and the SAS v France case. See 
also Martínez-Torrón (2014) for a thorough discussion of reli-
gious pluralism and the European Court of Human Rights. 
key, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Malaysia (among oth-
ers) and it has been the object of extensive academic 
analysis.3 I admit to being both weary and wary of hi-
jab/niqab conversations, but the SAS case raises a key 
issue in the conceptualization of religion by law, which 
is shared in some measure by social science: there is a 
deep divide between religion as it is imagined and reli-
gion as it is practiced. Moreover, both realms are con-
                                                          
3 See, for example, Abu-Odeh (1993), Alvi, Hoodfar, & 
McDonough (2003), Bakht (2012), Beaman (2013), Bracke and 
Fadil (2012), Dot-Pouillard (2007), Fadil (2011), Fournier and 
Amiraux (2013), Hoodfar (1997), Jouili (2011), and Lewis 
(2011).  
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cerned, at some level, with the idea that we must ‘live 
together’ in shared space and that there must be rules 
for doing so. Living together, though, has become a 
code through which religious minorities are expected 
to comply with ‘our values’. Narrowly conceptualized, 
there is little room for negotiation or flexibility, but ra-
ther, a rigid portrayal of who ‘we’ are and what ‘our’ 
values include. Though social scientific research sug-
gests that there is widespread sharing of values across 
a broad spectrum of differences (see Woodhead, 
2009), including religious difference, living together, or, 
vivre ensemble, is often used in a manner that excludes 
religious minorities. In SAS, the government argued, 
and the Court eventually agreed, that the legislation 
banning face covering “was a question of responding to 
a practice that the State deemed incompatible, in 
French society, with the ground rules of social commu-
nication and more broadly the requirements of ‘living 
together’” (para. 57). 
I begin by describing three broad themes or con-
texts within which this analysis of SAS is situated. The 
first is the body of literature broadly focused on the 
theme of lived religion. Americans Robert Orsi (2005) 
and Meredith McGuire (2008) have both worked ex-
tensively on this theme, attempting to map varieties of 
religious practice that take place within or related to 
organized religion as well as those that are outside of 
it. McGuire’s work is especially important because she 
has taken up the gendered nature of scholarly defini-
tions of religion and what counts as religion. In particu-
lar, she has responded to Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, 
Swidler and Tipton’s (1985) valourization of a particular 
kind of religion over what they famously described as 
“Sheilaism” in Habits of the Heart, challenging the gen-
dered assumptions Bellah et al. make and noting that 
“Because Bellah’s team focused their interviews on re-
spondents’ beliefs and commitments, expressed in re-
sponse to very narrowly focused interview prompts, 
they did not learn much more about the nature of Shei-
la’s religious experiences or her actual spiritual practic-
es (if any)” (McGuire, 2008, p. 152). 
The focus on lived religion has more recently turned 
to religion in everyday life, or the everyday practice of 
religion. This body of research captures the nuance and 
ebb and flow of religion in day-to-day life. It reveals a 
wide range of practices, but also the inextricable links 
between multiple vectors of influence (community, life 
events, institutional pressures) and bases of decision-
making around religious practice and belief. Dessing, 
Jeldtoft, Nielsen and Woodhead’s (2013) Everyday 
Lived Islam in Europe shifts attention from integration 
and the normative intricacies of ‘accommodation’ to 
the ways that Muslims live everyday life at home, 
school, in relation to health care needs, and so on.  
In their study of café culture and Muslim leisure in 
Beirut, Lebanon, Lara Deeb and Mona Harb (2013) out-
line three rubrics of morality amongst participants: re-
ligious, social, and political-sectarian. These rubrics do 
not always align perfectly, they argue, and there is a 
constant navigation of them through leisure choices. 
They found that participants understood that the rules 
of the moral systems in which they live are flexible and 
open to interpretation (2013, p. 18).4 In describing 
their research in a particularly religiously conservative 
area of the city (Dahiya), Deeb and Harb describe the 
café scene:  
“Partly because cafés are pickup sites, youths treat 
them as catwalks, taking the opportunity to display 
their taste, piety, status, politics, and bodies…in typi-
cal Lebanese style, nearly all women wore heels and 
makeup, with variations in how heavily the cosmetics 
were applied. In other words, with the exception of a 
greater proportion of young women wearing head-
scarves, youths in cafés in Dahiya dress like Lebanese 
youths elsewhere in the city. Most of them dress to 
be noticed, itself a violation of the religious rubric, 
which forbids publicly attracting attention from the 
opposite sex.” (2013, p. 170) 
Deeb and Harb’s research mirrors the findings of a 
study, “Religion in the Everyday: Negotiating Islam in 
St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador,” in which I 
have been involved in St. John’s Newfoundland with 
Jennifer Selby.5 We have also found a wide range of 
practices which are best described as flexible according 
to circumstance, life course, and context. For example, 
one of our participants describes her decision to wear 
the hijab after a tragic event in her life in which her 
mother was killed, her family home destroyed, and her 
mother’s body was missing for a period of time. During 
the frantic search for her mother’s body, Nour tried to 
think of something she could offer God for her moth-
er’s body and it was wearing the hijab. But, as she de-
scribes it: “My hijab is not like the perfect hijab. I think 
people who wear hijab think I’m not doing it the right 
way. I just cover my head you know sometimes a little 
bit is showing and so I’m not quite…I don’t do it quite 
the same way as people who wear the hijab do.” A rep-
lication of this study in Montreal by Amélie Barras has 
had similar results, revealing flexibility of practice that 
is made so by the complicated circumstances of every-
                                                          
4 The one exception was alcohol, which was somewhat less ne-
gotiable. 
5 This study includes 55 face to face interviews with Muslims in 
St. John’s. Our participants represent a range of ages, life stag-
es and degrees of religious practice, ranging from barely cul-
tural Muslims to orthodox Muslims. Jennifer Selby is the prin-
cipal investigator on that project, I am co-investigator. 
Jennifer’s primary area of interest is the exploration of Muslim 
identity in contemporary social life and it is her expertise that 
has led the conceptualization and implementation of this re-
search. 
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day life.6  
The reader will perhaps have noticed that the three 
‘everyday’ studies mentioned above each focuses on 
Muslims and Islam. The current scholarly preoccupa-
tion, indeed obsession, with Islam exhibits an exclusivi-
ty that is unfortunate. Here it is useful to turn to the 
broader literature from sociology of religion, which of-
fers insight on the second theme of women and reli-
gion. Looking across research on various religious 
groups, including orthodox Jews, the Amish, Latter-day 
Saints, and Charismatic Catholics7, there is much that 
can be learned by drawing these pieces of research in-
to conversation with each other, especially in relation 
to women and the conceptualization of women’s agen-
cy. One pattern that becomes visible by engaging in 
such a broad read is the tendency to view religious 
women as being without agency. Religious women are 
almost always seen as somehow being under the influ-
ence of both false consciousness and of men. There is 
no doubt that organized religion has patriarchal 
tendencies; however, to then dismiss religious women 
as being incapable of making decisions, or of being 
both religious and as having agentic capacity is reduc-
tionist. Moreover, the realm of the religious is not the 
only patriarchal game in town: so-called secular institu-
tions are also patriarchal. As I have written elsewhere, 
secularism and religion operate “in partnership as or-
ganizing discourses that often, but not always, occlude 
the ongoing and systematic oppression of women 
across cultures and societies in both the Occident and 
the Orient, West and East, globally and internationally 
(Beaman, 2014b, p. 238). However, in public discourse 
and in law, religion is often presented as having the 
market cornered on perpetuating women’s inequality, 
and secular society and institutions as the only hope 
for saving them. The emphasis on the equality of men 
and women in current policy, legal, and public debates 
is one manifestation of the way this belief circulates 
and is integrated in the regulation of religion.8 These 
notions of agency are pervasive in the SAS case, (and 
we will return to them shortly) and others like it, in 
which the nuance of religion in everyday life is flat-
tened and broader patterns between religions are ren-
dered invisible. Although an admittedly problematic 
category, there is something about ‘religion’ that is 
worthy of investigation. 
This leads to the third theme: there is a renewed 
energy to think more fully about religion and to create 
a more supple understanding of it. Rather than elimi-
                                                          
6 For a critique of the idea of the everyday see Fadil and Fer-
nando (2015a); for responses to this critique, see Deeb (2015) 
and Schielke (2015). For a reply to these responses, see Fadil 
and Fernando (2015b). 
7 See, for example, Beaman (2001), Campbell (2008, 2009), 
Kaufman (1991), Neitz (1987), and Olshan and Schmidtt (1994).  
8 See McRobbie (2009) and Hemmings (2011).  
nating it as a category of analysis, a more supple un-
derstanding insists on critical analysis or querying of 
the stability of religion as a category and the concur-
rent drawing in of some of the insights from lived reli-
gion scholarship. Thus, this approach asks about the 
power and political dynamics of naming something as 
religious (or not) simultaneously with a move away 
from institutional and textual understandings of reli-
gion. Some of the people engaged in this project in-
clude Knott, Taira and Poole (2013) with their notion of 
the secular sacred, Linda Woodhead (with Ole Riis, 
2012; 2016) and her focus on everyday religion, Court-
ney Bender (2003), and Helge Årsheim (2015), follow-
ing Dressler and Mandair (2011), with the notion of re-
ligion-making. Winnifred F. Sullivan (2005) and 
Elizabeth S. Hurd (2015) have each contributed to this 
re-crafting of the concept of religion by adding critical 
cautionary tales about its stability. SAS in many ways 
epitomizes this new scholarly religious imaginary. 
The SAS case contains traces of various currents of 
the way the religious person, especially the religious 
woman, is imagined. Some of these currents run in op-
position to each other, some create back eddies of re-
verse currents that create space to think differently 
about religion. Rather than focusing on the ‘decision’ 
as a concrete yes or no to SAS (and other niqab-
wearing women), my comments will consider the bina-
ries that are invoked in the case, holding that it is an in-
teresting study of the sorts of arguments that are play-
ing out in public discourse more broadly. Thus, for 
example, the ‘equality of men and women’ is a major 
component of public discourse about the limits on pub-
lically acceptable religious practices, and is integral to 
the idea of living together.  
2. The Facts 
With these preliminary considerations in mind, let us 
turn to the SAS case. As with any legal decision, the 
case begins with a brief description of the ‘facts’9. Most 
of this analysis relates to the statement of facts, rather 
than the lengthy substance of the decision. In brief, the 
case is about a niqab-wearing woman who challenges 
France’s face-covering ban. The facts as stated by the 
Court in this case are remarkable for a number of rea-
sons. The Court begins with the statement: “The appli-
cant is a French national who was born in 1990 and 
lives in France” (para. 10). From the outset, then, the 
Court establishes that this Muslim woman belongs, at 
least nominally, to France. This may seem a trivial mat-
ter, but the broader context is such that Muslims are, 
in France and elsewhere, often conceptualized as out-
siders who bring an ‘other’ religion as immigrants.  
As the Court continues, though, the articulation of 
the facts seems to respond to undercurrents of popular 
                                                          
9 See Foucault (1973); Smith (1978); Donzelot (1984, 1988). 
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myths, mobilizing truths, and beliefs about Muslims: 
Muslims are ‘from away’ and are poorly integrated (in 
fact, the beginning assurance that the applicant is a 
French national addresses this); Muslim women are 
oppressed and are controlled by their male relatives 
(“The applicant emphasized that neither her husband 
nor any other member of her family put pressure on 
her to dress in this manner” [para. 11]); Muslim wom-
en wear head and face coverings to annoy or to make a 
political statement, not because of genuine ‘faith’ 
(“Her aim was not to annoy others but to feel at inner 
peace with herself” [para. 12]); and niqab-wearing 
women are a threat to security (“The applicant did not 
claim that she should be able to keep the niqab on 
when undergoing a security check, at the bank or in 
airports” [para. 13]). This statement of facts sets up the 
decision that eventually follows. Though the Court 
takes (lengthy) pains to work through a wide range of 
positions about face-coverings and women (so much so 
that the Court’s decision to uphold the criminal pun-
ishment of the wearing of face-coverings almost comes 
as a surprise), in the end the notion of living together, 
interpreted so as to inevitably mean that one must 
show one’s face, prevails. 
Valérie Amiraux argues that the flow of infor-
mation, or ‘authoritative declarations’, about head and 
face coverings “is reminiscent of the social function of 
gossip, the ways in which it betrays secrets and per-
petuates rumours.” Gossip, argues Amiraux, creates a 
“sort of authority, regardless of the initial source” 
(Amiraux, 2014, 2016). Despite, for example, a large 
body of research that finds minimal evidence for the 
notion that women are forced to wear head coverings, 
and indeed in many cases their husbands/fathers ask 
and in some cases beg them not to,10 the notion that 
Muslim women are forced by their male relatives to 
cover their heads and faces persists in public dis-
course.11 This gossip, to use Amiraux’ idea, permeates 
the social fabric of the courts, becoming support for a 
framework that requires a statement of facts such as 
that in SAS.  
In a sort of reverse reinforcement, the statement of 
facts mobilizes these myths, or gossip, by addressing or 
partly refuting them. I say partly refuting because other 
                                                          
10 For example, during the interview with Nour her son, in his 
late teens, came home and she shouted out to him “you don’t 
like it when I wear hijab, do you?” See also Alvi et al. (2003), 
Clarke (2013), and Mossière (2013). 
11 In the interviews conducted by Barras in Montreal one of the 
interviewees reports an incident on a ski lift in which the (non-
Muslim) man seated beside her heard her answer her cell 
phone in Arabic proceeded to interrogate her about her reli-
gion and expressed astonishment that she had been permitted 
to go skiing without a male family member, thus replicating the 
very patriarchy he imagined himself to be criticizing, and also 
demonstrating the power of ‘gossip’ and the narrative of the 
imperilled Muslim woman. 
than the beginning “the applicant is” (emphasis mine) 
the Court is careful to preface the ‘facts’ with “in the 
applicant’s submission,” “according to her explana-
tion,” “the applicant emphasized,” and so on. These 
subtle qualifiers construct the statement of facts as 
facts according to the applicant rather than by the 
Court, lending them a tenuous quality that opens the 
possibility of doubt and positions the facts themselves 
as questionable. Moreover, the framing of the facts 
works up the story in a particular manner, whilst creat-
ing the impression that this is the only possible rendi-
tion, or the only facts that matter.12 
One statement in the facts was particularly intri-
guing, as it characterized SAS as deciding to wear her 
niqab ‘when the mood strikes’. The Court noted the 
following: 
“The applicant added that she wore the niqab in 
public and in private, but not systematically: she 
might not wear it, for example, when she visited 
the doctor, when meeting friends in a public place, 
or when she wanted to socialise in public. She was 
thus content not to wear the niqab in public places 
at all times but wished to be able to wear it when 
she chose to do so, depending in particular on her 
spiritual feelings.” (para. 12, emphasis mine)  
3. Tensions and Bifurcations 
3.1. Fuzzy Religion in the Everyday 
My tongue in cheek description of SAS’ decision-
making process regarding her wearing of the niqab as 
‘when the mood strikes’ is intended to gesture to a dis-
juncture between religion as it is lived and practiced 
and religion as it is often imagined. Not only law, but 
social science and other scholarship generally have had 
difficulty moving out of a conceptualization of religion 
that relies on identity rigidity, rather than on a fuzzier13 
and more fluid understanding of how people ‘do’ reli-
gion. Most challenging is recognizing the flexibility of 
religion that is brought about by life course, circum-
stance, and context without then doubting the com-
mitment or seriousness with which the practitioner 
takes her religion. Acknowledgement of flexibility often 
comes at a cost to the practitioner when her practices 
come up against rules, laws, or customs that run coun-
ter to them, particularly when she positions herself in 
relation to a specific religious tradition: ‘but that isn’t 
really religious’ or ‘that is custom, not religion’. Similar-
ly, variability in practice can cast doubt on the necessi-
                                                          
12 For critical legal scholarship on case law and the ‘facts’, see 
Amsterdam and Bruner (2002), Belleau and Johnson (2008), 
and Johnson (2002). 
13 On the topic of fuzzy religion, see Voas (2009) and Voas & 
Day (2010). 
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ty of it. As an aside, it is not only those ‘outside’ of 
these practices that engage in such doubt: counter-
currents within religion pose similar challenges, ques-
tioning whether particular practices are ‘cultural’ or 
‘religious’. 
The introduction of flexibility in practice renders 
commitment suspect: in this approach, religion can on-
ly be essentialized (the five pillars) and ‘pure’—one ei-
ther wears the niqab, or one does not. Although there 
is space in SAS for an alternative conceptualization of 
religion, the potential vagaries of her ‘mood’ casts 
doubt on SAS’ sincerity, even as it is her own sincerity 
and conviction that is the measure of her commitment. 
This becomes especially true when a moody choice is 
juxtaposed against the ‘values of the nation’, which is 
linked to living together. The use of a citizenship course 
as a sentence for violating criminal code provisions re-
lated to the facial covering ban implies that the offend-
ing woman is outside of citizenship, or does not know 
how to be a good citizen because of her religion or her 
wearing of a religious symbol. The Court notes that 
“the purpose of the course is to remind the convicted 
persons of the Republican values of tolerance and re-
spect for the dignity of the human being and to make 
them aware of their criminal and civil liability, together 
with the duties that stem from life in society” (para. 
28). Religious values, however identified, and the val-
ues of the nation are positioned against each other, ra-
ther than being in possible harmony, continuous, or in-
distinguishable. In the end, the Court acknowledges 
that niqab-wearing women may be disproportionately 
impacted by the ban, but that it is justifiable in order to 
achieve the social ends of living together. 
3.2. Religious Women and Agency 
Religious women are consistently assumed to be defi-
cient in their capacity to make decisions about their 
own lives.14 Paradoxically, religious women who are as-
sessed as having agency either choose not to be reli-
gious or to be religious in ways that fit with secular 
ideals. Only the correct decision is judged to engage 
agency. The religious is imagined as an ideological con-
straint that impedes women’s abilities to choose. The 
secular is imagined as ideologically free space, in which 
women’s agency is unconstrained. Mayanthi L. Fernan-
do (2010) argues that secular assumptions about free-
dom, authority, choice, and obligation preclude public 
intelligibility of particular kinds of religiosity.  
Nadia Fadil (2011) examines the extent to which 
not veiling can be understood as a technique of the 
production of self that is functional to shaping a liberal 
                                                          
14 See Beaman (1999, 2008, 2012), Davidman (1991), Gallagher 
(2003), Olshan and Schmidt (1994), Mahmood (2005, 2009), 
Kaufman (1991), Neitz (1987), and Palmer (1994). 
Muslim subject.15 She highlights the complex agency of 
the non-veiled Muslim, but makes an important obser-
vation that has implications beyond Muslim women: 
“The secular regulatory ideal is not gender neutral, but 
draws on a particular perspective on the (female) body, 
which views the disclosure of certain bodily parts (such 
as the hair and face, the figure) as essential for achiev-
ing ‘womanhood’” (2011, p. 96). Jacobsen (2011), Jouili 
(2011), Mahmood (2005, 2009) and Pham (2011) each 
consider the complex ways in which piety, agency, and 
the human subject are layered and situated, and most 
importantly, are not captured by the “binary model of 
subordination and resistance” (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 74).  
The Court in SAS reviews various reports and opin-
ions of a number of commissions and groups who in al-
most every instance comment on the equality of men 
and women. One of these is the report of the parliamen-
tary commission established by the Presidents of the Na-
tional Assembly in 2009. That report takes the view that 
the veil is an infringement of the principle of liberty and 
is a “symbol of a form of subservience and, by its very 
existence, negated both the principle of gender equality 
and that of the equal dignity of human beings” (para. 17; 
it also positions the wearing of the niqab as being moti-
vated by radicalism of individuals and not religion). In its 
judgment of December 2012, the Constitutional Court 
addressed the issue of women’s choice:  
“Even where the wearing of the full-face veil is the 
result of a deliberate choice on the part of the 
women, the principle of gender equality, which the 
legislature has rightly regarded as a fundamental 
value of democratic society, justifies the opposition 
by the State, in the public sphere, to the manifesta-
tion of a religious conviction by conduct that cannot 
be reconciled with this principle of gender equali-
ty.” (para. 42, B.23) 
Religious women, then, are subject to an agency over-
ride when the state knows best.16 Throughout the deci-
sion, the theme of women’s oppression, the denial of 
women’s agency, women’s coercion, the breach of 
women’s dignity, and violence against women appears 
in numerous contexts, each time related to Muslim 
women in particular.  
What are the broader questions about agency that 
are raised by the literature on religious women and the 
SAS case?17 How is agency used to legitimate particular 
                                                          
15 See also Jouili (2011) for a similar argument. 
16 It is not, of course, only and always religious women who are 
subject to such an override. The increasingly restricted access 
to abortion in many Western democracies employs a similarly 
patriarchal stance.  
17 See Sarah Bracke and Nadia Fadil (2012, p. 52), who remind 
us that “a piece of clothing cannot itself be oppressive or 
emancipatory.” 
 Social Inclusion, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 3-13 8 
practices and to exclude or denigrate others? When is 
the subject visible, so to speak, and when does she dis-
appear?18 What are the conditions under which wom-
en are constructed as being ‘free’ and under what cir-
cumstances are they held to be forced or not exercising 
free will? Who makes those decisions and when?19 To 
what end? 
3.3. Evidence v. Gossip 
The extensive social scientific research documenting 
the range of motivations for wearing the niqab and hi-
jab has not deflected the notion that women who wear 
them are oppressed or the idea that the niqab itself is 
inherently oppressive. There is a curious wilful blind-
ness to the evidence in favour of a narrative of oppres-
sion that has come to constitute truth in relation to 
Muslim women. The ‘authority’ (to draw again on 
Amiraux’s analysis) of the notion that Muslim women 
are oppressed circulates in the submissions by the var-
ious agencies, groups, and arguments considered by 
the Court in SAS.  
For example, although France’s National Advisory 
Commission on Human Rights issued an opinion oppos-
ing the banning of the face covering, it too remains fo-
cused on the Muslim woman as imperilled, noting the 
detriment the law could pose to women, “because 
those who were made to wear the full-face veil would 
additionally be deprived of access to public areas” (pa-
ra. 18). The Commission also emphasized the need to 
support women who were subject to violence.  
The truth of the ‘gossip’ of Muslim women’s op-
pression is necessarily accompanied by a second narra-
                                                          
18 See Kennedy (2009) for a discussion of cosmetic genital sur-
gery and female genital mutilation in the context of choice. See 
Pham (2011) for a comparison of the way agency is invoked for 
‘women of cover’ v. the construction of consumerism as 
choice. Nguyen (2011) explores the use of particular indices of 
‘correct living’ in the context of the Kabul Beauty School, argu-
ing that they echo earlier histories of imperial statecraft. 
Khandelwal (2009) argues that most people in the US overes-
timate their own agency and underestimate that of women 
elsewhere.  
19 Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler and Saba Mahmood 
challenge the Western “conceit of the self-owning individual 
presumed free from all forms of coercion, including those po-
tentially entailed in religion, commerce, love, belief and com-
portement” (2009, pp. 13-14; see also Mahmood, 2001). In 
their introduction to Gender, Agency, and Coercion, Sumi 
Madhok, Anne Phillips and Kalpana Wilson are cautious about 
judgements that condemn women’s choices: “But judgemen-
talism is not the same as judgement, and it should be possible 
to avoid the kind of moralising that tells others what they 
ought to think and do without thereby losing the capacity to 
challenge structures of domination and power” (2013, p. 12).  
The roles of collectivities, both as frameworks for action and as 
generators of agency, as well as the reshaping of the coercion-
agency binary, are key themes in the volume.  
tive—the myth of the equality of women. An underly-
ing binary shapes the discussion of the equality of men 
and women in that the religious is equated with wom-
en’s oppression and the secular with women’s free-
dom, dignity, and agency.20 Equality, which is always 
situated in the secular, is part of this story. Angela 
McRobbie has done some especially insightful work on 
the ways in which the myth of women’s equality circu-
lates to shut down critical analysis of women’s inequal-
ity. She argues that through the “tropes of freedom 
and choice” feminism has been rendered redundant, 
and that “post-feminism positively draws on and in-
vokes feminism as that which can be taken into ac-
count, to suggest that equality is achieved, in order to 
install a whole repertoire of new meanings which em-
phasize that it is no longer needed, it is a spent force” 
(McRobbie, 2009, p. 12). The myth of women’s equality 
glosses history21, ensuring that “there is no trace what-
soever of the battles fought, of the power struggles 
embarked upon, or of the enduring inequities which 
still mark out the relations between men and women” 
(McRobbie, 2009, p. 19). 
A second piece of ‘gossip’ circulates through the 
submissions considered by the Court: the danger of the 
niqab as a political statement/action. As mentioned 
above, the Court notes in the statement of facts that 
SAS does not engage in the wearing of the niqab to an-
noy people. Throughout the case, mention is made of 
the political use of Islam in both those submissions in 
favour of the ban and those opposed to it. For exam-
ple, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council 
of Europe stated in his ‘Viewpoint’ that “the wearing of 
full cover dress has increasingly become a means of 
protesting against intolerance in our societies. An in-
sensitive discussion about banning certain attire seems 
merely to have provoked a backlash and a polarisation 
in attitudes” (para. 37). To be sure, there is social sci-
entific data to support the idea that some women wear 
face and head coverings in part as a statement of soli-
darity or protest. But this ignores the intertwining of 
the religious with the political and sets up ‘real’ religion 
as being outside of politics, rather than immersed and 
active in political life. At its best (though I show my bias 
                                                          
20 As Deepa Kumar points out, the West does not have a mo-
nopoly on either women’s equality or women’s oppression. In-
deed, using the example of Egypt, he notes that liberal West-
ern traditions have made significant contributions to women's 
inequality (2012, pp. 44-48). 
21 As Clare Hemmings argues, we need “to examine the ways in 
which Western feminist stories about the recent past coincide 
unnervingly with those that place Western feminism firmly in 
the past in order to 'neutralize' gender equality in its global cir-
cuits” (2011, p. 11). Furthermore, she says “Agency is thus mo-
bilized discursively as the opposite of inequality rather than as 
part of the negotiation of power relations in constrained cir-
cumstances” (Hemmings, 2011, p. 209, emphasis hers). See al-
so Douglas (2010).  
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here) religion has been a force for social justice, and it 
is undeniably linked to politics. Boldly stated, it is Islam 
and politics that is the specific concern in the current 
social landscape.  
4. Conclusion: An Alternative to Living Together 
The specifics of SAS and her implied spiritual whimsy22 
mark a stark contrast with the oppressed Muslim 
woman who must be rescued by society and the state 
and who poses a threat to social cohesion. She does 
not understand, so goes the rhetoric, the whole con-
cept of living together and the obligation to expose 
herself (like other ‘emancipated’ women do). I do not 
use the phrase ‘spiritual whimsy’ disrespectfully. The 
research in which I and others have been engaged re-
veals a flexible and situated approach to religion that 
stands in contrast to a more rigid and institutional im-
agining of religion. I am not so sure that this insight is 
new, but that in focusing on one way of conceptualiz-
ing religion the contours of context in relation to reli-
gion have been largely ignored.  
One of the key motifs in the case, as well as in pub-
lic discourse in France and beyond, has become the no-
tion of ‘living together’ or ‘vivre ensemble’. Though it 
sounds well-intentioned and like a code for inclusivity, 
it is often translated as a mechanism for disciplining 
those who ‘don’t really understand’ how to live in 
harmony with others. It has become a rather heavy and 
inflexible concept rather than a point for negotiation 
and discussion about what it means to live together 
with difference. Thus, for example, citizenship courses 
are required of those who violate the ban on face cov-
ering, drawing to our attention the link between vivre 
ensemble and a failure of discipline regarding citizen-
ship behaviour. Questioning the status quo results in a 
characterization of the challenger as not really under-
standing the ‘values’ of the nation. Re-training, disci-
plinary action, and corrective socialization are the solu-
tions to this failure.  
France is not the only nation in which this idea of 
living together has currency, and in which the apparel 
of Muslim woman is linked to citizenship. Zunera Ishaq 
is a 29-year-old niqab-wearing Muslim woman who, on 
October 9, 2015 finally took the oath of citizenship and 
became a Canadian citizen. She fought the federal gov-
ernment, most recently in the Federal Court of Ap-
peal23, for the right to wear her niqab while taking her 
oath of citizenship. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld 
her right to wear the niqab and stated that “there is no 
evidence of broad effects upon Muslim women gener-
ally or the larger Muslim community” (para. 36). It also 
dismissed the motion of the then minister of citizen-
                                                          
22 This is, I would argue, the overall effect of the presentation 
of her agency in the case and certainly not my read.  
23 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Ishaq, 2015 FCA 151.  
ship to stay the matter pending appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.24 
As in SAS, though Ishaq herself is articulate, deter-
mined, and devoted to her nation, these qualities do 
not prevent the equation of niqab with women’s op-
pression and barbarianism. The then Conservative 
Prime Minister made a number of statements regard-
ing the case, saying “it is offensive that someone would 
hide their identity at the very moment where they are 
committing to join the Canadian family” (Whittington 
& Keung, 2015). The Conservative Party’s website ded-
icated a webpage to the niqab saying covering one’s 
face while being sworn in is “not the way we do things 
here” (Conservative Party of Canada, 2015). He also 
called the niqab a “product of a culture that is anti-
woman” (Chase, 2015). In addition, he made a state-
ment in which he divided ‘new’ and ‘old stock’ Canadi-
ans (CBC News, 2015). In September of 2015 during the 
federal election campaign, he promised to create a 
‘Barbaric Cultural Practices’ hotline if he was elected, 
which he was not (Powers, 2015). 
In thinking about this idea of living together, which 
as previously mentioned has a rhetorical appeal that is 
difficult to displace, Jacques Derrida develops it as an 
expansive notion that folds in the notion of living well 
together. Rather than rejecting living together as a lost 
cause, he redraws its boundaries, articulating a differ-
ent vision which draws from the real of the everyday, 
and which models a version of what I have called else-
where ‘deep equality’ (see Beaman, 2014a):  
“If ‘living together’ then means ‘living well togeth-
er,’ this signifies understanding one another in 
trust, in good faith, in faith, comprehending one 
another, in a word, being in accord with one anoth-
er. Why then speak of accord? Why this language of 
the heart [coeur], of accord and concord, even of 
‘mercy [miséricorde],’ and of the compassion that 
must bring us closer and a bit more quickly to the 
question of ‘forgiveness,’ with or without teshuvah? 
The language of the heart reminds us that this 
peace of ‘living together,’ even if it is a peace of jus-
tice and equity, is not necessarily under the law of 
the law, at least in the sense of legality, of law 
[droit] (national or international) or of the political 
contract; and here, as I often do, I will distinguish, 
but without opposing them, justice and law [la jus-
tice et le droit].” (Derrida, 2012, pp. 25-26) 
Moreover, Derrida is cautious about what he calls the 
‘new legalism’, or what others have described as the 
juridification of social life.25 Though they have very dif-
                                                          
24 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Ishaq, 2015 FCA 212. 
25 For an elaboration of the concept of juridification, see Fokas 
(2015), Koenig (2015), and Sandberg (2014) and Richardson,  
(2015), who uses judicialization.  
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ferent endings, both the SAS and Ishaq cases can be 
understood as part of the technology of law: 
“this new legalism, sustained by technological re-
sources of investigation, communication, ubiquity, 
and unprecedented speed, runs the risk of reconsti-
tuting, under the pretext of transparency, a new in-
quisitorial obsession that transforms anybody into a 
subject or a defendant summoned to ‘live together’ 
according to the ensemble, while renouncing not 
only what one names with the old name of ‘private 
life,’ the invisible practice of faith, and so on; but al-
so, and quite simply, while renouncing this possibil-
ity of the secret, of separation, of solitude, of si-
lence, and of singularity, of this interruption that 
remains, we have seen, the inalienable condition of 
‘living together,’ of responsibility and of decision.” 
(Derrida, 2012, p. 34) 
The French legislation assumes that displaying one’s 
face is an integral part of living together: “[The legisla-
ture] was entitled to take the view that the creation of 
human relationships, being necessary for living togeth-
er, was rendered impossible by the presence in the 
public sphere…of persons who concealed this funda-
mental element of their individuality” (SAS, para. 42, 
B.21), thus licencing the ‘inquisitorial obsession’ identi-
fied by Derrida, and putting the niqab squarely in op-
position to the ‘good citizen’. We thus return to the 
idea that a more supple understanding of religion and 
consequently religious identity is required, both in its 
lived dimensions, and also in its ability to be coupled 
with multiple identities such as citizen, feminist, moth-
er, employee and so on. Part of the suppleness is a 
move away from identity rigidity and oppositional posi-
tioning.  
Both SAS and Zunera Ishaq defy such opposition, 
seeking to re-frame themselves as both covered wom-
en and good citizens. Ishaq expresses no hesitation in 
showing her face for the purposes of identification be-
fore the citizenship ceremony, but wishes to swear her 
allegiance to Canada being all that she is, including, 
among other things, a Muslim woman. In her twenties, 
SAS combines devout religiosity with a complex ap-
proach to religion that is not easily captured by tradi-
tional social scientific imaginings of religion or by the 
unwieldy machinery of law. Based on her spiritual feel-
ings, she is sincere in her religious observation, but be-
ing Muslim is, as is the case for Ishaq, not all of who 
she is. Essentializing her identity to ‘Muslim’ misses 
how she is a political, economic, and social participant 
in the world around her. It eludes her commitment to 
being ‘French’ and the ways that she constructs her 
own citizenship as a sometime niqab-wearing woman 
who wears her religiously-inspired covering when the 
mood strikes.  
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